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ABSTRACT / SUMMARY 
 
This paper focuses on competition policy in the European Union from an economic, 
micro-governance point of view. It analyses recent developments in economic 
governance in the field of the common competition policy, which had for a long time 
been the exclusive competence of the European Commission (Community method), 
notably the nature and governance implications of recent developments associated with 
single market integration, the 5
th EU enlargement, and the workload backlog of the 
Commission.  
 
The common competition policy has been subject to various changes against the 
background of increasing market integration and the expansion of the single market (for 
instance, the European merger regulation and the liberalisation of network industries, 
regulated at the national level), most recently by the new institutional framework (EC 
regulation 1/2003 by the EU Council) which entered into force on the day of the EU’s 
fifth enlargement on 1 May 2004 and which implies the direct and parallel application 
of EU anti-trust laws by national competition authorities (NCA).These developments in 
terms of the economic governance of competition policy render it important to analyse 
the competences of NCAs with respect to the European Commission but also in regard 
to each other and to sectoral national regulators. 
 
The paper concludes that although the single market and competition policy had looked 
profoundly Europeanised in the Community sphere, single market integration has not 
led to parallel centralisation at the Community level but to decentralisation and that 
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1. Common competition policy and the internal market 
 
European Union competition policy is inseparable from the internal market. The 
foundations of a common competition policy were laid in the Rome Treaty of 1957, 
along with European economic integration in the form of a customs union and a 
common market. The common competition policy, applicable when intra-community 
trade is affected, aims at promoting competition and guaranteeing a level playing field 
for economic actors in the internal market. In that it has been important for ensuring the 
sustained political acceptance not only of the European single market but of the broader 
European integration project, characterised at it is by the primacy given to economic 
integration and to policy areas related to economics.
2 
 
From the outset, the objectives of European economic integration in the European 
Community (EC) / European Union (EU) can be qualified as rather ambitious. They did 
not resume to the lowest integration level, a free trade area
3, as in the case of EFTA 
(European Free Trade Area), but aimed at a customs union (hence with a common 
external tariff and commercial policy) and a common market with the free movement of 
goods, services and production factors (capital and labour). The European Commission 
was given wide-ranging powers in defending the common market, operating as an 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to João Gata, Steffen Hoernig, Stephen Martin, Francisco Torres and seminar participants 
at the University of Aveiro and the University of Pisa for discussions and suggestions. The usual 
disclaimer applies.  
2 At the time of the Rome Treaty, economic integration was regarded as a politically acceptable way of 
increasing integration while creating the basis for later political cooperation (see for instance Sbragia, 
2004). 
3 Balassa (1961) distinguishes five (in increasing order) stages of economic integration, ranging from a 
free trade area, customs union, common market, economic policy harmonisation to complete economic 
integration. The stated aims of European economic integration goals thus stopped short of economic 
policy harmonisation and complete economic integration. However, as argued by Pelkmans (1980 and 
1984), given the reality of mixed European economies in which state intervention is not limited to border 
controls and macroeconomic policies and in which the state has a pervasive role of regulator, the 
implementation of the single market could not be achieved without further integration. Against this 
background, Tsoukalis argues that it has increasingly become apparent in the case of the EU that the 
realisation of the common market and a customs union implies total economic integration (Tsoukalis, 
1997: 61-2).  
independent institution in the area of competition policy, for a long time with exclusive 
competencies. Its decisions can be challenged in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
 
Yet, after almost thirty years of European integration at the time of the White Paper on 
Completing the Internal Market of 1985, the state of European economic integration had 
only advanced as far as an incomplete customs union with an internal market in goods 
(Wallace and Wallace, 2000). The reason was that the abolition of tariff barriers to trade 
was not sufficient to implement a complete customs union and a common market. 
Notably, the realisation of a customs union required not only the abolition of intra-EC 
tariffs and quotas and the implementation of a common external tariff (achieved until 
1968), but also the abolition of different national voluntary export restraints
4 (VER) 
imposed on third countries that segmented national markets and hence impeded price 
arbitrage. As to the common market, the internal market programme focussed on 
invisible, non-tariff barriers and within that on the free movement of services and of 
production factors and to a lesser extent on goods. After the abolition of the visible 
trade barriers it was different national regulatory frameworks that had come to 
constitute the most potent barriers to intra-community trade. The abolition and/or 
harmonisation of these invisible barriers to trade however touched upon the very role of 
the state in national economies. It was only with the White Paper (containing close to 
300 measures)
5 in conjunction with the European Single Act of 1986 (allowing for 
voting the directives by qualified majority), and after the convergence of views on the 
economic role of the state and towards liberalisation, that the completion of the single 
market could finally go ahead. 
 
Product and financial market liberalisation and competition policy are efficiency-
enhancing. With trade liberalisation and the creation of a single market the EU 
embarked on ambitious and wide-ranging policies of market-building nature. The 
construction of the single market has resulted in wide-spread European regulation 
(Tsoukalis, 1997). According to Majone (1999), the EU is essentially a regulatory state, 
regulation being interpreted as addressing market failure with a view to Pareto-
efficiency, and competition policy in this context is efficiency-enhancing rather than 
                                                 
4 Note that all VERs had to expire until 2000, being against the spirit and the letter of the OMC. 
5 The number of regulations related to the single market has grown significantly thereafter, reaching about 
1500 according to Sapir et al. (2004).  
redistributive. Competition policy is one of the most important market-building powers 
that lie with the European Union (Sbragia, 2004). 
 
Hereafter we shall analyse whether and to what extent European economic integration 




2. Economic governance of the common competition policy 
 
The EU’s particular characteristics – unlike other international organizations it has 
political and moreover changing objectives and it is not a federal state either but rather 
an umbrella organisation that comprises its three pillars – raise the question of 
governance (defined as established patterns of rule without an overall ruler) in the 
absence of a government. Governance at the level of the single market, competition and 
taxation is referred to as micro-governance (Sapir et al., 2004). 
 
In accordance with the theoretical literature on federalism, responsibilities between the 
EU and Member States should be allocated on the basis of economies of scale, 
externalities and heterogeneity of preferences: the EU should engage in those policy 
areas where economies of scale and externalities are large and preferences are rather 




In the European Union governance - the extent to which policies are developed and 
sustained - is not static. The European Union is a system of governance without a 
government where most power is transferred to the EU supranational institutions when 
the Community method is employed. The Community method chiefly focuses on 
market-building policies (regulation) and is therefore at the centre of the EU policy 
                                                 
6 According to Alesina and Perotti (2004), two governance issues, namely overlapping institutions and 
jurisdictions between the EU and Member States and the clash of different views on government 
(dirigiste versus laissez-faire) have created problems for European integration.  




The common competition policy is a case in point of the Community method, 
characterised by the development of common policies that replace national policies and 
which are shaped by supranational institutions. The Community method manifests itself 
in the competition policy arena by turning the European Commission into an 
independent agency
8, initially with exclusive competencies, with Treaty-based powers 
to guarantee a level playing field by preventing cartels and other types of anti-
competitive behaviour and by controlling state aids.
9 In terms of governance categories 
for managing economic policies, Sapir et al. argue that (most of) competition policy is 
managed by delegation to the Commission, while the control of state aids is an example 
of commitment (by the Member States, controlled by the Commission).
10  
 
Notwithstanding, Stubbs, Wallace and Peterson (2004:152-3) argue that the EU’s need 
to legitimise itself by delivering outputs of greater good to European citizens (output 
legitimacy) has led to new debates about governance processes and methods even of 
those policies that have been sustained at the European level for a long time, such as 
competition policy where responsibility mainly lies with the Commission and hence the 
single market looks Europeanized. They put forward that “competition policy is 
gradually shifting away from an approach centred on supranational governance to a 
process in which networks of national competition authorities will make more 
decisions”. It is the changes in economic governance in the area of competition policy 
that will be analysed next. 
 
                                                 
7 Market regulation is an arena easily dominated by technicians and private actors and subject to 
organised interests of various kinds. The European Parliament (EP) provides an important institutional 
safeguard, in that most EU market-making legislation is co-decided by the Council and the EP, with the 
possibility of national parliaments to intervene (see Stubb, Wallace and Peterson, 2004). 
8 While the Commission has the primary responsibility for decisions, EU decisions of a purely 
administrative nature and that regard the implementation of policies in the area of competition policy, are 
dealt with by a committee procedure (comitology in EU speak) through which national officials can 
monitor the execution of  EU policies (Stubb, Wallace and Peterson, 2004:142). 
9 Note, however, that there is no single EU policy process, but that at least three different variants of the 
policy making process may be distinguished (see Stubb, Wallace and Peterson (2004), for a 
characterisation): apart from the above-mentioned Community method (“neo-functional spill-over”), the 
coordination method (“networked governance”) and the intergovernmental method. Wallace and Wallace 
(2000) distinguish five types of EU policy processes.  
10 See Sapir et al. (2004:76-7) for details on the four different arrangements for managing economic 
policies that they distinguish in the EU: delegation; commitment; coordination and autonomy.  
 
3. Market integration and functional spill-over 
 
The Treaty of Rome laid the legal basis for a common competition policy (articles 81-
89, EC Treaty), to be conducted by the Commission. Thus the EU had exclusive 
competence, that is, the primary legal authority to act, in the case of collusive behaviour 
(article 81) and the abuse of a dominant position (article 82) by firms and the control of 
state aids
11 (articles 87-88). Its direct powers with respect to firms were initially limited 
to ex post control of behaviour and did not include ex ante control of market structure; 
ex ante control of market structure became an area of Community action only with the 
European Merger Regulation (regulation 4064/89). The liberalisation of sectors that are 
subject to monopoly, i.e. network industries and natural monopolies became an area of 
Community action in the wake of the single market programme. It is based on article 86 
of the EC Treaty and on directives and decisions by the Commission.
12  
 
The case of the European merger control regulation illustrates how single market 
developments trigger the need for Community-level legislation.
13 At the time of the 
Rome Treaty, the Commission was not given any direct powers for the ex ante control 
of mergers (although provisions for such powers had been made in the Treaty of Paris 
that created the European Coal and Steel Community). Member governments and the 
Commission adopted a generally favourable attitude towards national champions and 
their creation that would supposedly help European firms to create a large enough 
dimension to become competitive with respect to US multinationals. Moreover, national 
anti-merger legislation was largely inexistent.
14 With the introduction of anti-merger 
                                                 
11 The Treaty forbids state aids independently of the form they take to the extent that they distort intra-
community competition (with derogations for those with positive repercussions for the EU). 
12 Article 86(3) grants the Commission a specific surveillance duty of public undertakings and 
undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights and empowers the Commission, 
should it consider it necessary because Member States maintain in force measures contrary to Treaty 
rules, to address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States. Since its first decision in 1985, the 
Commission adopted 15 decisions in most of the areas where Member States granted special and 
exclusive rights, with the exception of energy and railways where the liberalisation process started more 
recently (http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/liberalization/overview/ of 8 November 2004. 
13This first part of this section draws on Tsoukalis (1997: 81-92). 
14 This time lag in enacting anti-merger legislation at the Community level can be ascribed to the fact that 
Member States with anti-merger legislation had not been keen on transferring legal powers to the EC, 
although by 1989 only Britain, France and Germany had effective instruments for merger control while 
Ireland and the Netherlands had some legislation. Of the other member countries, those with small, open 
economies could claim to rely on international trade as a substitute for domestic competition rules, an 
argument less valid in the case of larger and / or more closed economies such as Italy and Spain.  
legislation in West Germany in 1973, and the accession of Britain which had enacted 
anti-merger legislation in 1965, the Commission decided to initiate proposals for similar 
legislation at the Community level in 1973. However, anti-merger legislation – the 
European merger control regulation - was only adopted 16 years later, in 1989, when the 
internal market programme was being implemented and against the background of 
rising numbers of intra-community mergers and acquisitions.  
 
The change of attitudes on the part of national governments and firms on EC-level ex 
ante control of mergers can be attributed to the impact of the single market in 
conjunction with globalisation on the one hand but also the need for (due to rulings by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ)) and the capacity to act (due to the gradual 
convergence of national attitudes towards competition policy) on the other hand. As 
already noted, in the single European market Community-level legislation became 
desirable when merger activity began to spill over national boundaries. In addition, 
decisions by the ECJ (Continental Can in 1973 and Philip Morris-Rothmans in 1987) 
opened former articles 85 and 86 (now articles 81 and 82, EC Treaty) for an ex ante 
control by the Commission in some narrowly defined cases, thus creating a grey area of 
legal powers between the national level and the Commission and the desirability of a 
one-stop-shop to avoid multiple jurisdictions. Furthermore, the negotiation of the 
European merger regulation proved difficult in practice because of the definition of 
Commission powers (threshold to activate and demarcation line between EC and 
national competences) and the criteria to be used for evaluation (complicated by 
different competition policy traditions and attitudes towards industry policy). In the 
event the one-stop-shop objective was somewhat weakened by opening the way for 
joint EC and national decisions in at least some narrowly defined cases and by double 
control. 
 
In the above case economic integration, fostered by the internal market programme and 
by other developments in the marketplace and in technology, has led to some functional 
spill-over and some transfer of powers to the Commission, in particular through the  
new merger regulation but also through the stricter application of competition rules by 
the Commission (Tsoukalis, 1997:92). With respect to take-overs, the increase in cross-
border merger and acquisition activity in the EU and the importance of financial market 
integration and performance for competitiveness has resulted, after 14 years, in some  
functional spill-over in the form of the European take-over directive, but it is a 
minimum standards directive that will not result in a uniform set of take-over rules 
throughout the EU and it is enforced at the national level without transfer of powers to 
the Commission.
15 Differences in national company law and in industrial traditions 
(sometimes typified as Rhine capitalism versus the Anglo-Saxon model) have led to the 
definition of minimum standards rather than harmonised rules on take-over bids and 
substantial opt-outs for Member State level are allowed for. With the transposition 
process still on-going, it is early to draw final conclusions but the different options 
taken by Member States so far suggest that the result may well be a tilted playing field 
between different offerers for the same company. Furthermore, with supervision at the 
national level, there will be complicated shared supervisory jurisdiction due to which 
Member State law and take-over rules will be applicable.
16 The fact that the directive 
contains a provision stating that the Commission must examine the Directive after 7 
years and propose revision if necessary points towards some anticipated practical 
problems with the European take-over directive in the light of the single market 
objectives. 
 
The liberalisation of sectors subject to monopoly also suggests that market integration 
does not automatically lead to centralisation in the EU sphere. The implementation of 
the single market programme triggered directives to liberalise network industries 
(telecommunications, gas, energy, etc) and raise competitiveness which were not 
initially contemplated in the White Paper. They did not lead to the transfer of powers to 
the Community level. Rather, the common legal framework and similar concerns led to 
the emergence of national regulators that are independent of Member State governments 
(Sapir et al., 2004). 
 
The issues raised by the involvement of national authorities in EU competition policy 
will be analysed hereafter. Note furthermore that EU competition law enforcement not 
only raises issues of governance as to the borderline between Community and national 
competencies but also, due to its extra-territorial application, possible problems of 
                                                 
15 The European take-over directive came into force on 20 May 2004 and must be transposed into national 
legislation by 20 May 2006. See 
http://europa.eu.int/eur.lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_142/l_14220040430en00120023.pdf 
16Compare http://www.freshfields.com/practice/corporate/publications/pdfs/12218.pdf  
“system friction” between overlapping legislations with third countries (for instance, the 




4. The micro-governance of EU anti-merger and anti-trust policy 
 
While the Commission has the primary legal authority to act in the EU in terms of the 
common competition policy and is as well an international actor, and despite the fact 
that the implementation of the single market led to the functional identification of new 
legislative needs in the EU sphere, in terms of economic governance this did not result 
necessarily in more centralisation of competencies in the Commission. 
 
According to Sapir et al. (2004:88), the increasing interpenetration of markets raises 
questions as to the delimitation of competences between the EU and Member States on 
the one hand and to the extra-territorial competences of different national regulators in 
the EU on the other hand. Increasing market integration also illustrates that the 
appropriate level of regulation follows from the degree of market integration. They 
point out that there is a trade-off in most cases between national institutions’ proximity 
to the market and the advantages of centralisation at the Community level (limited 
assignment uncertainty, avoidance of regulatory capture
18) and that legal uncertainty 
should be minimised. 
 
4.1 European Merger Control regulation 
 
The European merger regulation filled a legislative gap on preventive merger control in 
the face of the large number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the 1980s. In 
terms of governance it resulted in the transfer of more powers to the Commission. 
However, this new regulative framework triggered similar responses at the national 
level and to that extent as well opened the possibility for delegation. The Merger 
Control Regulation allows for delegation of a merger case to a national competition 
authority (in many Member States only created in the late 1980s and early 1990s) 
                                                 
17 Ostry (1990) already called attention to the possibility of system friction. 
18 According to Moravcsik (2002), regulatory policy makers in EU policy making – by being largely 
isolated from majoritarian democratic contests – are less easily captured by particular, concentrated 
interests.  
should it apply for it. In practice, delegation happened – although the formal conditions 
for Community-wide relevance were fulfilled - when the merger concerned mainly a 
Member State, implying the application of national law by the national competition 
authority.
19 This was rendered possible because of the existence or creation of identical 
preventive merger control systems in the Member States to control concentrations of 
national dimensions. 
 
While the application of the competition rules in the Treaty had been the exclusive 
domain of the Commission, the Merger Control Regulation brought about a first 
change, allowing for delegation by the Commission of a case to national competition 
authorities (NCA) even when a case formally falls under Community rules; note, 
however, that the NCAs then apply national legislation. As already discussed above, the 
creation of NCAs and the convergence of attitudes and national policies were a 
precondition for that to happen.  
 
4.2 New Regime for Community Competition Policy (regulation 1/2003) 
 
The New Regime for Community Competition Policy (or EC Modernisation Package, 
discussed in detail in Mateus in this volume) establishes a new institutional framework 
and clarifies Commission actions, in order to avoid an overstretching of the 
Commission in the light of the growing number of pending cases and against the 
background of EU enlargement to ten new Member States. Increasing European market 
integration on the one hand and the limited resources of the Commission on the other 
hand to safeguard a level playing field thus prompted further developments in terms of 
governance. Among others, an end was put to the requirement of prior notification of 
restrictive agreements as well as to the Commission monopoly in the concession of 
exemptions, by giving parallel competencies to the Commission and to national 
authorities.  
 
The new decentralised antitrust regime means that EU antitrust law is applied by 26 
antitrust agencies in the European Union. Note that the parallel and direct application of 
articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty in effect imposes the primacy of Community law over 
                                                 
19 Sapir et al. 2004 , box 6.2.  
national law. To that extent it ensures a more consistent application than directives that 
need to be transposed into national law. The Commission will be involved in the big 
cases, leaving the smaller ones to NCAs, although it can take over cases that it views as 
of particular relevance (precedent-setting, law-making). Enforcement is parallel not 
only as far as NCAs but as well as national courts are concerned. 
 
The (EC) Regulation 01/2003, applicable since 1 May 2004, effectively decentralises 
the application of common competition rules through delegation to NCAs at the level of 
articles 81
20 and 82, EC Treaty, on restrictive agreements and the abuse of a dominant 
position. NCAs apply them fully (including article 81, section 3 which implies a 
political evaluation of costs and benefits of the effect of a restriction on efficiency and 
consumer well-being) in parallel with the Commission. The Commission only retains 
exclusive control over state aids and Community-wide concentrations (with the 
possibility to delegate) but comes to share competencies as far as cartels and dominant 
positions are concerned. The Commission however has the right to call cases to itself 
(recall the recent merger control case EDP/ENI/GDP, DG COMP M3440, which 
constituted the central part of Portugal’s energy restructuring plan). Moreover, it has 
seen its investigation and enforcement powers increased. 
 
Sapir et al. (2004:87-8) argue that regulation 01/2003 raises serious issues in terms of 
the governance of European competition policy. In particular, they put forward that 
there is a conflict under the new regime that will be recurrent, namely between the 
avoidance of extra-territorial effects of decisions by NCAs on the one hand and the need 
to avoid multiple procedures on the other. The mechanisms to ensure consistency of 
decisions across jurisdictions (notably with respect to article 81 section 3), are, apart 
from cases taken by the Commission, the European Competition Network (ECN)
21 with 
                                                 
20 With EC Regulation 1/2003, the requirement of prior notification of restrictive agreements to the 
Commission was scrapped and the impact on economic balance only subject to an ex post analysis by 
competition authorities, along the lines of US practice. With no direct clearance by the Commission, it 
becomes the firms’ responsibility to conduct a self-assessment (and anti-trust audits) of the impact of their 
behaviour on the market. Note that the Commission is given more powers and resources to combat cartels 
(for instance, to raid the homes of executives of firms under suspect). 
21 There are several mechanisms in place to foster the consistency of the application of competition law in 
the EU: The ECN (see Mateus, 2005) aims to foster the efficient and coherent application of Community 
law across the EU, consolidate the same competition policy culture and manage the interfaces. The 
involvement of NCAs in the Consultative Committee on Mergers (regulation 4064/89) allows for the 
discussion of individual cases and of the adequacy of existing instruments and the necessity to create new  
exchange of information and mutual assistance between NCAs and the Commission, 
and the issuance of Commission notes and opinion letters (not legally binding in general 
and on courts in particular) on a variety of issues. Mateus (2005) clarifies that national 
court decisions may not go against the practice of Commission decisions. The creation 
of the same competition culture in Europe, one of the stated aims of the ECN, seems 
thus vital. Braz (2005) defends that economic principles on the one hand and actions 
such as workshops for judges at the national level contribute to the consistency of 
application in the context of regulation 1/2003.  
 
4.3 Governance issues 
 
Sapir et al. (2004) caution that NCAs and courts, in particular as far as article 81, 
section 3 is concerned, are not acting as agents of the EU but are independent in their 
decisions, so that their assessment as to the overall benefits might vary across Member 
States and result in a major challenge to consistency across jurisdictions when cases 
involve several Member States. Unless the Commission takes those cases which might 
be difficult in practice, there will be multiple proceedings (with possible different 
outcomes), given that national constitutional law provides for the delegation to 
Community institutions but not to other Member State institutions. 
 
The 2004 EU enlargement implied the extension of the reach of EU antitrust law to the 
10 accession states in conjunction with the entering in force of the reform of EU 
antitrust rules. The entering in force of the new decentralised regime in those countries 
was facilitated by the fact that NCAs were already well established since the new 
Member States had been required to set up EU compatible antitrust agencies and 
antitrust rules well before entering the EU.
22 Their NCAs however are confronted with 
specific practical difficulties of enforcement due to an over-burden of work related to 
the after-effects of monopolisation under communist regimes, the increase in foreign 
                                                                                                                                               
ones. Furthermore, there is an informal working group on Trade and Competition (with a view to the 
OMC negotiations) and to state aids. 
22 See Riley, 2005. Riley moreover puts forward that  many Eastern NCAs are better prepared to apply 
the new decentralised anti-trust regime than some of the Western NCAs, given that some of them (in 
particular Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland) have been applying EU style antitrust law for longer 
than some of the Western Member States.  
direct investment as a consequence of business opportunities and hence increased 
merger activity, and their involvement in draft legislation assessment.
23 
 
Both Gonçalves (2005) and Braz (2005) call the attention to the fact that the 
liberalisation of sectors subject to monopoly in the EU brings with it the danger of 
overlap within national jurisdictions. A two-folded approach is adopted, that is, the 
regulation of the underlying infrastructure, overseen by the (national) regulator, and the 
liberalisation of the services, overseen by the (national) competition authority. Some 
overlap is possible due to specific knowledge required for creating the adequate 
competition conditions (sectoral regulator) and for dealing with infringements 
(competition authority). Braz adds that competition for the market is a solution for 
situation when competition in the market is constrained. 
 
4.4 Extra-territorial effects on third countries 
 
As to the danger of increasing system friction as a consequence of the extra-territorial 
application of EU competition rules, the recent Microsoft case has illustrated that this 
danger exists with respect to the US. However, bilateral cooperation, the emphasis on 
anti-trust policy and its economic foundations which brings the EU closer to US 
practice (see Martin, 2005) and more similar approaches (the EU merger analysis now 
focuses on a major impact in terms of the reduction of competition, as in the US – see 
Mateu, 2005) might reduce the potential for system friction between the EU and the US. 
As far as the European Economic Area (EEA), entered into force in 1994, is concerned 
and which comprises the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, the EEA 
agreement features specific competition provisions (articles 53-64) which mirror those 
of the EC Treaty. The European Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
have joint jurisdiction to apply the agreement (with the division of competencies laid 
down in articles 57-8 and its protocols) and the Commission having exclusive 
jurisdiction in the EEA to deal with all concentrations with a Community dimension, as 
defined in the European Merger Regulation.
24 
                                                 
23 Riley, 2005. 
24See  http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/international/bilateral/background/efta1_en.html, of 8 
November 2004. Two separate legal systems are thus applied in parallel, with the EEA agreement being 
applicable whenever trade with one or more EFTA states (except Switzerland) and one or more EU 





The EU has been acting as a catalyst for economic liberalisation, in line with an 
international trend, taking advantage of the convergence of national attitudes 
(homogeneity of preferences) and policies and liberalisation as a smallest common 
denominator. The result has been market integration in the single market and the 
question is whether and what kind of impact that had in terms of the micro-governance 
of competition policy. To the extent that the degree of market integration determines the 
level of centralisation, and in line with the Community method, market integration 
should have led to more centralisation at the EU level. However, there has been 
increasing decentralisation, with the exception of state aids, to the extent that NCAs 
have come to be involved in European anti-trust and anti-merger policy. This is true for 
the practice of the EU Merger Regulation and, in particular, for (EC) Regulation 1/2003 
of the EU Council on the parallel application of articles 81 and 82 TEC, which 
establishes a new institutional framework for anti-trust policy. 
 
The problem, not yet solved, is one of legal uncertainty that is not low in the case of the 
New Regime for Community Competition Policy, given that the problem of consistency 
of national decisions and/or jurisdictions is not resolved: First, the NCAs do not 
function as agents of the Commission, so that the Commission’s power to impose 
solutions is limited, although the primacy of EU law applies, with the ECJ as a 
safeguard. Second, the convergence of policies and the creation of the ECN might not 
be sufficient to achieve and guarantee consistency, especially since the latter one does 
not include national courts and given that the extra-territorial effects of national 
decisions on other Member States are not resolved. The problem is aggravated by the 
accession last May of ten new Member States with diverging competition cultures and 
capacities. 
                                                                                                                                               
matters between the European Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority is governed by 
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